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Abstract
Firms in markets such as health care and education are often prot constrained due to
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t status, and they are often viewed as being altruistic towards
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constraints lead to lower cost containment e¤orts, but higher quality if and only if rms are
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containment e¤orts, but lead to lower prices if and only if rms are su¢ ciently altruistic.
Prot constrained rmscost containment e¤orts are below the rst-best, while their quality
might be too high or too low. If prices are regulated, prot constraints can improve welfare
and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price, depending on the degree of
altruism.
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1 Introduction
In many markets, goods or services are provided by rms that face constraints on prot dis-
tribution, either because they have non-prot status or because they are subject to regulation
which limits the amount of prots that can be distributed to the owners of the rm. In these
cases, prots must be (wholly or partially) reinvested in the rm or spent on perquisites.
In this paper we analyse theoretically how prot constraints a¤ect rmschoices regarding
quality, price, and cost containment. The main applications of our analysis are regulated markets
such as health care, child care, long-term care and education, and we are particularly interested
in analysing whether prot-constrained rms in such markets are likely to o¤er higher or lower
quality than rms that do not face any constraints on prot distribution. This goes to the heart
of the question of whether owners of private rms that receive public funding should be allowed
to distribute prots, which is often a hotly contested policy issue with regulatory practices that
vary across countries.
To give a motivating example from education markets, in 1992, Sweden embarked on a
radical education reform programme, which has recently become the subject of intense debate
in the UK.1 The Swedish reform introduced free school choice and liberalised entry by removing
school ownership restrictions, including the ban on private for-prot schools. Private schools
receive public funding corresponding to the average cost per student for each student from
the municipality in which the school is located, but are not allowed to charge any top-up fees
or cherry pick pupils according to background. The Conservatives claim that the Swedish
experiment has been successful and consider introducing school choice and removing the ban on
for-prot schools in the UK. Labour, in contrast, claim that the Swedish reform has failed, and
in April 2010, Ed Balls (then Secretary of State for Education) wrote a letter to Michael Gove
(the current Secretary of State for Education), stating the following: Parents and taxpayers
across the country will be rightly shocked that you are willing to allow taxpayersmoney to be
diverted from its intended purpose the education of our children to the prots of the private
companies you want to prove it, even more so because the evidence from Sweden is that this very
1See, for instance, the article Swedish-Style Free SchoolsWont Improve Standards in the Guardian (9
February 2010).
2
SNF Working Paper No 30/12
policy caused educational standards across the country to fall.2
In this paper we directly address the concern expressed in the above statement by analysing
how rmsincentives for quality provision (for example, the educational standardsof schools)
depend on their ability to distribute prots. We analyse this question within a theoretical
framework that is commonly used for studying competition in markets such as health care
and education, namely a spatial competition model where consumers make their purchasing
decisions based on travelling distance, quality and price. In the main version of the model,
we assume that prices are regulated and that rms compete only on quality. Subsequently,
we extend the model to allow for price competition. We also allow the rms to become more
cost e¢ cient by investing in cost containment e¤ort. Quality is taken to be observable, but
non-contractible, as is commonly assumed in the literature,3 and we assume that there are both
monetary and non-monetary costs associated with quality provision. Furthermore, we assume
that rms are altruistic in the sense that they care about prots and (to some extent) consumers
benet. Finally, we model prot constraints as being equivalent to a tax on prots,4 the basic
underlying assumption being that owners prefer compensation in cash over alternative modes of
compensation, such as perquisites.5
Taken together, these model ingredients are particularly suited to describe provider behaviour
in markets such as education, health care, long-term care and child care. In all these markets,
quality is an important competition variable, whereas prices might be regulated or not. Travel-
ling costs also play a potentially important role in determining demand, e.g., distance to nearest
school, hospital, kindergarten, nursing home, etc.6 Furthermore, altruistic provider preferences
are generally acknowledged to be a relevant characteristic of such markets.7 Finally, in many
2Balls, Ed. Prot-Making Schools - My Letter to Michael Gove. 11 April, 2010 (http://www.edballs.co.uk)
3See Ma (1994) and Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b) for a detailed discussion on this issue in the
health care context. Our approach follows closely the literature on quality competition, like Ma and Burgess
(1993), Wolinsky (1997) and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006).
4A similar approach is used by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and Ghatak and Mueller (2011) in the context of
non-prot rms. See also Hansmann (1980, pp. 873-875) for anecdotal support for this formulation. Lakdawalla
and Philipson (2006) model the distribution constraint on non-prot rms as a (potentially binding) prot cap,
whereas in Easley and OHara (1983) the non-prot rms prot is set in a contract between the rm and the
society.
5Non-pecuniary compensation (perquisites) may involve di¤erent types of improvement in the working en-
vironment, such as lower e¤ort levels, free meals, shorter workdays, longer vacations, better o¢ ce facilities, etc.
6Empirical studies of the US health care market show that travelling distance and quality are the main
predictors of hospital choice (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Tay, 2003).
7 In the literature on health care provision, the assumption that health care providers (e.g., doctors and
nurses) are, at least to some extent, altruistic, is widely used and recognised. See, e.g., Ellis and McGuire
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countries, a signicant share of education, health care, long-term care and child care services is
provided either by non-prot institutions or by for-prot ones that are subject to some form of
prot regulation.8
In contrast to the main bulk of the literature on non-prot rms9, constraints on prot
distribution are taken to be exogenous in our analysis. The main reason for this is that we do
not conne our study to non-prot rms, but to prot-constrained rms more broadly. Indeed,
many rms are prot-constrained not by choice but by regulation. For instance, most European
countries do not allow for-prot schools to operate in their publicly funded educational system,
as highlighted by our example from the UK. Another interesting example is Norway, where
regulatory practices regarding prot distribution di¤er enormously between two otherwise similar
markets: education and child care.10 Whereas owners of private government-dependent schools
are not allowed to distribute any prots, owners of private government-dependent kindergartens
have so far not been subject to any prot constraints, although the government has recently
aired the idea of introducing prot caps that limit the amount of prots that can be distributed
in the child care market.
Similar regulatory restrictions often apply to hospitals and nursing homes. An interesting
example is provided by the English National Health Service. Before 2003 all publicly-funded
hospitals had the status of Acute Trusts with severe restrictions on how to spend surpluses. By
2014 all NHS Trusts will have a new status known as Foundation Trusts. Foundation status
implies greater nancial exibility: hospitals can retain nancial surpluses, they do not have to
break even, can invest in new services and reward sta¤ with higher salaries (Marini et al., 2008;
(1986), Chalkley and Malcolmson (1998a, 1998b), Eggleston (2005), Heyes (2005), Jack (2005), Kaarbøe and
Siciliani (2010), Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2011a), Brekke and Nyborg (2010) and Choné and Ma (2011). An
alternative approach, suggested by Iversen and Lurås (2000), is that physicians have lexicographic preferences in
patientshealth and income, so that health services are provided until the marginal health e¤ect is equal to zero.
There is also a recent literature on motivated agents in the broader public sector (Besley and Ghatak, 2006;
Halonen-Akatwijuka and Propper, 2008; Makris, 2009). See Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for an extensive
review of the motivated agents literature. The empirical evidence also suggests that altruism and motivation are
important components of healthcare workers job (Page, 1996; Le Grand, 2003) and that job satisfaction depends
on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of employment (Shields and Ward, 2001; Antonazzo et al, 2007;
Ikenwilo and Scott, 2007; Leonard and Masatu, 2010; Godager amd Wiesen, 2011; Henning-Schmidt et al., 2011).
8Rose-Ackerman (1996) reports gures showing that health and education institutions constitute well over 70
percent of the non-prot sector in the US, while the equivalent average gure for a group of 7 Western countries
is close to 50 percent. A similar (slightly lower) gure for a di¤erent group of Western countries (excluding the
US) is reported by Salamon et al. (2007).
9See Section 2 for a literature review.
10 In both markets, prices are regulated and quality is the main competition variable.
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between 2003 and now the new status was voluntary and hospitals had to apply for obtaining
the di¤erent status). Thus, with the above-mentioned examples in mind, we focus on the impact
and not the source of prot constraints, and we therefore set up a modelling framework that
captures important features of markets where prot constraints are highly relevant.
The results from our analysis show that, while a constraint on prot distribution always leads
to less cost e¢ ciency, the e¤ect on quality and (if not regulated) prices are more ambiguous.
If prices are regulated (as for most publicly-funded hospitals and schools in Europe) and rms
compete only on quality, prot-constrained rms provide higher (lower) quality in equilibrium
if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high (low). The reason is that altruistic providers choose
a quality level that exceeds the prot-maximising level. A prot constraint will then reduce
the negative marginal prots and thus induce a higher quality level given that the providers are
su¢ ciently altruistic. In the case of quality-and-price competition (as for example in the child-
care and nursing-homes markets), the imposition of a prot constraint always leads to lower
quality, while prices will decrease if rms have su¢ ciently altruistic preferences and increase
otherwise. The reason for the negative e¤ect on quality is that prices and thus prot margins
are reduced for high levels of altruism, which in turn reduces the prot incentive for investing in
quality. However, we show in an extension that if the altruistic rms only care about the quality
and not about the price consumers have to pay, then a prot constraint increases quality under
price competition if and only if rms are su¢ ciently altruistic.
We also perform a welfare analysis where we show that cost e¢ ciency is too low for prot-
constrained rms, while quality may be over- or underprovided in the market equilibrium. If
prices are set by the rms, quality is always underprovided if there are constraints on prot
distribution. However, if prices are set by a regulator, but not necessarily at the rst-best
optimal level, prot constraints may improve welfare for low or intermediate degrees of altruism,
depending on the price level. If price regulation is optimal, we show that price and prot
constraints can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the degree of altruism. For
example, markets with non-prot (as opposed to for-prot) rms should optimally face a lower
(higher) price if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high (low).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we o¤er a more detailed
discussion of related literature, before presenting the model in Section 3. The model is then
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analysed for the cases of price regulation (Section 4) and price competition (Section 5). Welfare
issues are analysed and discussed in Section 6, before Section 7 closes the paper with some
concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
Our theoretical analysis bridges two di¤erent literatures. The modelling approach follows the
literature on quality competition in regulated markets, particularly the strand of literature focus-
ing on spatial competition with applications to health and education. General contributions that
share many features of our modelling framework include Ma and Burgess (1993), Wolinsky (1997)
and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006), while similar papers focusing more exclusively on
competition in health care markets include Gravelle (1999), Lyon (1999), Beitia (2003), Brekke,
Nuscheler and Straume (2007), Karlsson (2007) and Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2011a).11 To
our knowledge, the present paper is the rst attempt to analyse quality competition in regulated
markets when rms face prot constraints. Moreover, with the exception of Brekke, Siciliani
and Straume (2011), this strand of the literature has generally not considered altruistic provider
preferences.12
Our specic modelling of prot constraints follows the literature on non-prot rms. In
this literature, the relationship between non-prot status and quality provision has also been
addressed. There are two main theories which o¤er a similar answer to the question of whether
non-prot rms o¤er higher or lower quality than for-prot rms, but for very di¤erent reasons
(see Malani et al., 2003, for an overview of the literature). The oldest formal theory of non-prot
rms explains the existence of such institutions by altruistic preferences. A recent example of
this strand of the literature is Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006), who assume that non-prot
rms are altruistic in the sense that they maximise an objective function that has output and
prots as separate arguments, and this gives them a competitive advantage (due to lower e¤ective
marginal costs) against for-prot rms. By extending this framework to include also preferences
for quality (see Malani et al., 2003), this theory predicts that non-prot rms will o¤er higher
11While Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2011a) allow for altruistic providers, this paper do not consider cost-
containment e¤ort, price competition, and, importantly, constraints on the distribution of prots.
12 In a framework of spatial competition, Del Rey (2001) analyses quality competition between state universities
that maximise objective functions that could be intepreted as reecting altruistic preferences.
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quality than for-prot rms. This follows straightforwardly from the altruism assumption, where
owners of non-prot rms are assumed to have a preference for quality.
In another class of models the existence of non-prot rms is explained as a partial solution to
an incomplete contracting problem. A relevant example of this approach is Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001), who consider quality choices by non-prot versus for-prot rms.13 They assume that the
market transaction takes place prior to the quality choice, and that quality is non-contractible.
This creates a moral hazard problem with rms having an incentive to shirk on quality. Since
non-prot rms cannot distribute the prots from shirking, they have a lower incentive to shirk
and will therefore choose a higher quality level. Thus, similar to the models based on altruism,
the prediction from this strand of the literature is that non-prot rms will provide higher
quality.
The theoretical framework in the present paper di¤ers from the above-mentioned approaches
in several important aspects. First, as stressed in the previous section, we are not interested in
explaining the existence of non-prot rms but rather to analyse the e¤ects of prot constraints
per se. Therefore we do not assume any relationship between prot constraints and altruism.
In this particular sense our approach is more related to the incomplete contracts approach in
the literature on non-prot rms. On the other hand, our model also di¤ers sharply from this
approach since we study quality choices in a spatial setting of quality competition between
di¤erent providers, using a framework that is motivated by our examples from health care and
education markets, and where price regulation is often an important feature of such markets. In
addition, we introduce cost containment e¤ort and non-monteary costs of quality provision, both
commonly used assumptions in the literature on health care provision, but not in the literature
on non-prot rms. Indeed, both of these assumptions are shown, all else equal, to contribute to
a negative relationship between prot constraints and quality provision, introducing potentially
important mechanisms that are not captured by the existing theoretical literature on non-prot
rms.
13The study by Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) builds on the seminal work by Hansmann (1980, 1996), where the
benet of non-prot rms is to mitigate contract failureproblems. Another paper in this strand of literature
is Easley and OHara (1983) who stress more specially asymmetric information between consumers and rms
(output cannot be observed). Ghatak and Mueller (2011) also use an agency approach and show that the choice
of non-prot versus for-prot status can arise from competition for motivated workers. However, quality is not
an issue in that paper.
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Our theoretical analysis could also o¤er some insights for interpreting the rich empirical
literature dealing with the question of whether non-prot hospitals provide better quality of care
than their for-prot counterparts. As observed by Malani et al. (2003), despite the fact that a
positive e¤ect of non-prot status on quality provision is one of the more clear-cut theoretical
relationships established in the literature on non-prot rms, the general picture emanating
from a number of empirical studies is considerably more ambiguous. Sloan (2000) o¤ers an
extensive review of this literature and concludes that the evidence appears to be mixed.14 A
recent meta-analysis by Eggleston et al. (2008) on US hospitals reports that the results depend
on the context (region, data source, period), but concludes that "studies representative of the
US as a whole tend to nd lower quality among for-prots than private nonprots".15
Empirical evidence on the e¤ect of non-prot status on quality provision in nursing home
markets is also somewhat mixed. The review studies by Hillmer et al. (2005) and Grabowski and
Hirth (2003) suggest that quality is higher for non-prot nursing homes in the US. Grabowski
and Stevenson (2008) instead nd that conversions from for-prot to non-prot status and
from non-prot to for-prot had no e¤ect on quality. Chou (2002) shows that non-prot nursing
homes provide higher quality only when the degree of asymmetric information between residents
and the provider is more pronounced (as measured by whether residents have received a visit
from a spouse or a child within a month from admission). Otherwise, no di¤erences in quality
are detected. Therefore, it is only when for-prot nursing homes have to compete e¤ectively
for demand that they raise quality to the level of non-prot ones, which is consistent with our
results.
The mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership type and quality pro-
vision may be somewhat hard to explain from existing theories in the non-prot literature and
we believe that our theoretical analysis, which introduces some novel mechanisms, could o¤er
some useful contributions in this respect.
14Sloan (2000) also reviews the theoretical literature related to non-prot rms in general and discusses its
relevance for the hospital market.
15Other relatively recent empirical studies on the relationship between hospital ownership type and quality
provision include Picone et al.(2002), Shen (2002), Milcent (2005), Lien et al. (2008) and Jensen et al. (2009).
The overall picture emanating from these studies remains rather mixed.
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3 Model
Two rms are located at the endpoints of the line segment S = [0; 1]. Firm 1 is located at the
left endpoint while Firm 2 is located at the right endpoint. Consumers are uniformly distributed
on S with total mass equal to one. Each consumer demands one unit from the most preferred
rm. The utility of a consumer located at z and buying from Firm i is given by
U (z; i) =
8><>: v + qi   pi   tz if i = 1v + qi   pi   t (1  z) if i = 2 ; (1)
where v > 0 is the gross utility of consuming the good, qi is the quality of the good, pi is
the price of the good and t > 0 is a transportation cost parameter. From the consumers
utility-maximising problems we derive the demand functions:
x1 (p1; p2; q1; q2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if q1   q2  p1   p2   t
z if p1   p2   t < q1   q2  p1   p2 + t
1 if q1   q2 > p1   p2 + t
; (2)
x2 (p1; p2; q1; q2) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if q1   q2  p1   p2   t
1  z if p1   p2   t < q1   q2  p1   p2 + t
0 if q1   q2 > p1   p2 + t
; (3)
where
z =
1
2
+
1
2t
[q1   q2   p1 + p2] (4)
is the location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between the two rms.
The monetary cost of supplying the good is given by c (xi; qi; ei), where ei is the amount of
cost containment e¤ort expended by Firm i. We assume that the cost function has the following
general characteristics: cx > 0, cq > 0, ce < 0, cxx  0, cqq > 0, cee  0, cxq ? 0, cxe  0 and
cqe  0. Notice that we allow for output and quality to be either cost substitutes (cxq > 0) or
cost complements (cxq < 0). Firm is prot function is then given by
i (xi; qi; ei) = pixi   c (xi; qi; ei) ; i = 1; 2: (5)
9
SNF Working Paper No 30/12
In addition to cost containment e¤ort, we also assume that there is a non-monetary (e¤ort)
cost associated with supplying quality above a minimum level (which is normalised to zero).16
The non-monetary costs of Firm i are given by the function g (ei; qi), where ge > 0, gee > 0,
gq > 0, gqq > 0 and geq = 0. We also allow rms to have altruistic preferences by assuming that
they care about the utility of their consumers. The objective function of Firm i is given by

i (xi; qi; ei; ; ) = (1  )i (xi; qi; ei) + bi (qi; xi)  g (ei; qi) ; (6)
where
b1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if q1   q2  p1   p2   tR z
0 (v + q1   p1   ts) ds if p1   p2   t < q1   q2  p1   p2 + tR 1
0 (v + q1   p1   ts) ds if q1   q2 > p1   p2 + t
(7)
and
b2 =
8>>>><>>>>:
R 1
0 (v + q2   p2   t (1  s)) ds if q1   q2  p1   p2   tR 1
z (v + q2   p2   t (1  s)) ds if p1   p2   t < q1   q2  p1   p2 + t
0 if q1   q2 > p1   p2 + t
; (8)
and where the parameter  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of altruism on the part of the rms.
The parameter  2 [0; 1) plays a key role in our analysis, as it measures the degree to which
the rm is prot-constrained. In the context of for-prot versus non-prot rms, the former is
captured by  = 0 while the latter is characterised by  > 0. Owners of non-prot rms cannot
distribute prots in cash but have to spend any positive net revenues on perquisites. Under
the assumption that owners prefer compensation in cash over compensation in perquisites, a
monetary net surplus (prot) has lower value for the owner of a non-prot rm than for the
owner of a for-prot rm, i.e.,  > 0.17 More generally, the above formulation of the rms
objective function is relevant for any market where a regulator places a constraint on the rms
16This is a commonly used assumption in the context of health care providers. See, e.g., Ma (1994) and
Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b). For example, a doctor might improve the quality of care by working
harder on diagnosing and/or treating patients without a¤ecting monetary costs like salary, capitation payments,
etc. The same argument applies to nurses, teachers, researchers, etc.
17This is way of modelling the di¤erence between non-prot and for-prot rms is also used by Glaeser and
Shleifer (2001) and Ghatak and Mueller (2011).
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ability to distribute prots.
4 Quality competition with price regulation
We consider rst the case where prices are regulated and thus exogenous to the rms; i.e.,
p1 = p2 = p. This assumption holds for example in the hospital sector of many European
countries, where hospitals are paid according to a DRG (Diagnosis Related Group) system,
which species a di¤erent tari¤ for every diagnosis or procedure. In the education sector, schools
funding is often related to the number of pupils, and in some countries (like the UK) universities
can charge students fees but the fees are regulated and do not vary across universities.
We assume that quality and cost containment e¤ort are chosen simultaneously and indepen-
dently. The rst-order conditions for the optimal choices by Firm i are given by
@
i
@qi
= (1  )

(p  cx) @xi
@qi
  cq

+ 
@bi
@qi
  gq = 0; (9)
@
i
@ei
=   (1  ) ce   ge = 0: (10)
Notice that each rm chooses the optimal level of quality by balancing three di¤erent consid-
erations: net revenues (), consumer benet (b) and e¤ort of quality provision (g). Quality is
optimal when the sum of the marginal nancial benet from quality and the non-nancial benet
arising from concerns for consumersutility is equal to the marginal monetary and non-monetary
(disutility) cost. All else equal, altruistic preferences push the optimal quality above the prot
maximising level. Prot constraints reduce the relative weight given to nancial considerations
as opposed to non-nancial ones.
Using (2) and (7) to calculate the marginal e¤ects of quality investments on demand and
aggregate consumer utility, and subsequently setting qi = q and ei = e for i = 1; 2, quality and
cost containment e¤ort in the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, (q; e), are
given by the following pair of equations:
(1  )

p  cx
2t
  cq

+

2

1
2
+
v + q   p
t

  gq = 0; (11)
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  (1  ) ce   ge = 0: (12)
By the implicit function theorem, the e¤ect of prot constraints on the equilibrium choices of
quality and cost containment e¤ort are given by
@q
@
=   1


ce (1  )

ceq +
cex
2t

+

p  cx
2t
  cq

((1  ) cee + gee)

; (13)
@e
@
=   1


ce

  (1  )
cxq
2t
+ cqq

+

2t
  gqq

  (1  ) ceq

(p  cx) 1
2t
  cq

; (14)
where
 :=

(1  )
cxq
2t
+ cqq

  
2t
+ gqq

((1  ) cee + gee)  (1  )2 ceq

ceq +
cex
2t

> 0: (15)
As an instructive way to analyse the e¤ects of prot constraints on quality incentives, we will
rst consider four special cases. These special cases, which will be presented as four Lemmas,
allow us to isolate each of the di¤erent mechanisms at play.18
Lemma 1 If there is no altruism, no cost containment, and no disutility of providing quality,
prot constraints have no e¤ect on equilibrium quality provision when prices are regulated.
This is the standardcase of prot-maximising rms where all benets and costs are mon-
etary. In this case, prot constraints reduce marginal revenues and marginal costs by the same
proportion, like a non-distortionary prot tax, and have thus no e¤ect on the optimal quality
choice.
Lemma 2 If there is no altruism and no cost containment, but a non-monetary cost of quality
provision, prot constraints lead to lower quality when prices are regulated.
In this case, prot constraints reduce the marginal prot gain of providing quality while
the marginal disutility of quality provision remains unchanged, thereby reducing the rms
incentives to provide quality. Thus, the presence of non-monetary quality costs introduces a
new mechanism that has (to our knowledge) not been previously explored in the theoretical
18The proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions in the paper are given in Appendix A.
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literature on non-prot rms, contributing to a negative relationship between prot constraints
and quality provision.
Lemma 3 If there is no altruism and no disutility of providing quality, but rms can reduce
their production costs through cost containment e¤ort, prot constraints lead to lower quality
when prices are regulated.
Similar to non-monetary quality costs, the presence of cost containment e¤ort also con-
tributes to a negative relationship between prot constraints and quality provision. The reason
is that a prot constraint reduces the incentive for cost containment and therefore lowers the
equilibrium level of cost containment e¤ort. With a lower price-cost margin, (p  cx), the in-
centive for providing quality is correspondingly reduced. This is a mechanism that is specic
to the case of price regulation, since rms are not able to adjust prices according to changes in
marginal costs. It is also a mechanism that has (to our knowledge) not been previously explored
in the literature.
Lemma 4 If there is no cost containment and no disutility of providing quality, but rms are
altruistic, prot constraints lead to higher quality when prices are regulated.
Altruism introduces the following mechanism: Altruistic rms choose a level of quality pro-
vision where the marginal net revenue loss is balanced against the marginal altruistic benet.
Placing a prot constraint on the rms reduces the marginal net revenue loss while leaving the
marginal altruistic benet unchanged, implying that the objective function of each rm is max-
imised at a higher level of quality. Thus, all else equal, altruistic preferences contributes to a
positive relationship between prot constraints and quality provision. This result supercially
resembles the established result in the literature on altruistic non-prot rms. However, there
is a crucial di¤erence. While, in the referred literature, non-prot rms o¤er higher quality
because they are altruistic, the result in Lemma 4 shows the quality e¤ect of prot constraints
per se, when rms are altruistic. Once more, the mechanism behind this result relies on prices
being xed and does not necessarily carry over to the case of price competition, as we will show
in Section 5.
Lemmas 1-4 treat each of the di¤erent mechanisms at play separately. In the general case,
with altruistic preferences and non-monetary costs of quality and cost containment, the e¤ect
13
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of prot constraints on the rmsincentives for quality provision depends qualitatively on the
sum of the two terms in the square brackets in (13). The rst term is positive while the second
term has an a priori ambiguous sign. If the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently low, so that

2

1
2 +
v+q p
t

  gq < 0 at the equilibrium level of quality, the second term is also positive
(since p cx2t > cq), implying that the equilibrium level of quality is always lower when rms face
a prot constraint. However, if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high, the second term in
(13) is negative and might dominate the rst term, thus reversing the relationship between prot
constraints and incentives for quality provision.
We can further explore this trade-o¤ by assigning some specic parametric forms to the cost
and e¤ort functions. Suppose that the monetary costs take the following linear-quadratic form
ci = (c  ei)xi + k
2
q2i ; (16)
while the non-monetary (e¤ort) costs are assumed to be given by
gi =
w
2
e2i +

2
q2i : (17)
We assume that w > 12c , which ensures that the Nash equilibrium outcome is an interior solution
(i.e., c  e > 0). We also assume that p 2 (c; v   t). The lower and upper bounds on p ensure,
respectively, that the rms have a positive price-cost margin and that the net utility of any
consumer is non-negative when buying from either rm, at any quality level qi  0.
Applying (16)-(17) in (11)-(12), equilibrium quality and cost containment e¤ort are given by
q =
(1  ) (p  (c  e)) +    t2 + v   p
2t ( + k (1  ))   (18)
and
e =
(1  )
2w
: (19)
Uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium requires
 <  := 2t ( + k (1  )) : (20)
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While the e¤ect of prot constraints on equilibrium cost containment e¤ort is clearly negative,
inserting (19) into (18) we can establish an exact condition for prot constraints to increase
quality incentives in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 Under quality competition with price regulation, there exists a non-empty set
A = (b; ), where
b := kt (1  )2 + 2t (1  ) + 2tw (p  c)
(1  ) + w (p  c) + kt2w + 2ktw (v   p) ; (21)
such that placing a constraint on prots leads to higher quality if  2 A, and lower quality
otherwise. Prot constraints always lead to less cost containment in equilibrium.
Thus, placing a prot constraint on rms leads to higher quality provision in equilibrium if
and only if the rms are su¢ ciently altruistic. Otherwise, incentives for quality provision are
dampened by prot constraints. One policy implication of this result is that policy makers who
are worried about underprovision of quality in education or health care markets should actually
allow government-dependent schools or hospitals to distribute prots, but only if the providers
are su¢ ciently prot-oriented.
The intuition for this result follows from the discussion of the more general case above. The
parametric example demonstrates that the possibility of a positive relationship between prot
constraints and incentives for quality provision always exists in equilibrium. From (21) it can
also be shown that b = 0 if w !1 and  = 0, while b > 0 otherwise. This conrms the results
from the special cases outlined in Lemmas 1-4.
The main avour of the results derived in this section is maintained if prot-constrained
rms face competition from rms that are not subject to any constraints on prot distribution.
This is conrmed in Appendix B, where we derive the equilibrium outcome for a mixed duopoly,
where only one of the rms face prot constraints.
5 Quality and price competition
Let us now extend the model to allow also for price competition between the rms. This
assumption holds for example in several markets for long-term care, like nursing homes or
care homes for the elderly. We assume here that all decisions are made simultaneously and
15
SNF Working Paper No 30/12
independently. In Appendix C we show that the relationship between prot constraints and
equilibrium quality is qualitatively similar if we instead let the rms commit to their quality
choices before making their price and cost containment decisions.
The rst-order condition for the optimal price chosen by Firm i is
@
i
@pi
= (1  )

xi + (pi   cx) @xi
@pi

+ 
@bi
@pi
= 0; (22)
while the rst-order conditions for optimal quality and cost containment e¤ort are given by
(9) and (10), respectively. The optimal price is such that the marginal revenue is equal to the
marginal cost, where the latter also includes the reduction in consumersutility due to altruism.
We can also write the price-cost margin as
pi   cx =

xi +

1  
@bi
@pi

1
 @xi=@pi : (23)
With zero altruism, the price mark up is proportional to the inverse of the price elasticity of
demand, (pi   cx) =pi = xi=pi @xi=@pi . With positive altruism, for a given quality and e¤ort, higher
altruism implies a lower price since the provider is willing to charge a lower price the more
she cares about the consumers. Notice that the price e¤ect of altruism is stronger for prot-
constrained rms. The cost of reducing the price (for altruistic reasons) is a loss of prots, but
these lost prots are less valuable for a prot-constrained rm. Such a rm is consequently
willing to reduce the price more.
Substituting (23) into (9) the optimal condition for quality can be rewritten as:
(1  )xi @xi=@qi @xi=@pi + 

@bi
@qi
+
@bi
@pi
@xi=@qi
 @xi=@pi

= (1  ) cq + gq; (24)
The marginal benet of quality is such that the marginal benet from higher revenues and
higher consumers utility is equal to the marginal monetary and non-monetary cost. Notice
that the altruism parameter is multiplied by two terms with opposite signs. On the one hand,
higher altruism implies a higher direct incentive to increase quality because the provider benets
from higher consumer utility (@bi=@qi > 0). On the other hand, higher altruism also implies a
lower price (as argued above), which compresses the marginal nancial benet (through higher
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revenues) to increase quality. Using the explicit expressions for demand and consumer utility, it
turns out that @bi@qi =
@bi
@pi
@xi=@qi
@xi=@pi
. Thus, the two e¤ects cancel each other out, implying that the
optimal provision of quality does not depend on the degree of altruism when rms are able to
optimally adjust their prices. The optimality condition (24) therefore reduces to
(1  ) (xi   cq) = gq: (25)
As long as there are non-monetary costs of quality provision (i.e., gq > 0), prot constraints
always lead to lower quality since such constraints reduce marginal revenues more than they
reduce marginal costs (of quality provision).
Although the above analysis is made for a given level of cost containment e¤ort, the result
that prot constraints reduce quality provision also holds in equilibrium, since the condition in
(25) does not depend on marginal production costs. However, in order to assess the e¤ect of
prot constraints on equilibrium prices, we need to solve explicitly for the Nash equilibrium.
Applying the specic cost and e¤ort functions given by (16)-(17), and using the derived demand
and consumer benet functions, (2)-(3) and (7)-(8), respectively, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
outcome is
q =
1  
2 ( + k (1  )) ; (26)
e =
(1  )
2w
; (27)
p =
(2 (1  ) (t+ c  e)   (2v + t)) ( + k (1  ))   (1  )
2 (1     ) ( + k (1  )) : (28)
Uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium require
 <  := 1  : (29)
Equilibrium cost containment is the same as under price regulation. Each rm optimally
chooses the level of cost containment e¤ort such that the marginal benet, (1  )xi, equals
the marginal cost, wei. Due to the assumptions of unit demand and full market coverage,
which imply that total demand is perfectly inelastic, the marginal benet of cost containment
e¤ort is given by (1  ) =2 in any symmetric equilibrium and does not depend on the quality
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and price levels. This explains why price competition does not a¤ect the equilibrium level
of cost containment e¤ort. Correspondingly, the e¤ect of prot constraints on equilibrium cost
containment e¤ort is qualitatively and quantitatively independent of whether prices are regulated
or subject to competition.
The following proposition summarises the e¤ects of  on p, q and (for completeness) e:
Proposition 2 Under quality and price competition, placing a constraint on prots leads to
lower quality and less cost containment in equilibrium. The equilibrium price increases (de-
creases) if the degree of altruism is below (above) a strictly positive threshold level bp < .
We have already discussed why prot constraints lead to lower cost containment e¤ort and
lower quality in equilibrium. How do prot constraints a¤ect the equilibrium price? There
are two counteracting incentives at work. On the one hand, prot constraints imply that the
price-reducing e¤ect of altruism is stronger, as previously discussed. On the other hand, prot
constraints lead to less cost containment e¤ort, implying higher marginal production costs with
a corresponding higher optimal price. If altruism is su¢ ciently low, the second e¤ect dominates
and equilibrium prices are higher under prot constraints. This is perhaps surprising, as intu-
itively we may expect prot constraints to reduce prices since the rm can less easily appropriate
the prots from higher prices. However, the prot constraints also a¤ect the optimal choice of
cost containment e¤ort. The reduction in e¤ort translates into higher production costs, which
ultimately lead to an increase in equilibrium prices.
5.1 Extension: Alternative formulation of altruism
We have so far assumed that rmsaltruism considerations are perfectly aligned with consumer
preferences and bi is equal to the aggregate utility of consumers buying from rm i, which
depends on both price and quality (see (7) and (8)). It may instead be argued that rms
care more about quality and less about price when considering consumers preferences. To
emphasise the implications of this alternative assumption, we assume that rms care only about
gross consumer utility and do not take consumerspuchasing expenditures into account. The
18
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altruistic component of the rm is now dened as ebi, where
eb1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if q1   q2  p1   p2   tR z
0 (v + q1   ts) ds if p1   p2   t < q1   q2  p1   p2 + tR 1
0 (v + q1   ts) ds if q1   q2 > p1   p2 + t
(30)
and an analogous expression holds for Firm 2, eb2. We do not investigate such extension in the
presence of price regulation (as in Section 4) since the results are qualitatively una¤ected by
this new assumption (see Brekke, Siciliani and Straume, 2011b). This is intuitive: since prices
are xed, consumerspurchasing expenditures cannot be a¤ected by the rm. It is only when
prices are endogenous that the results di¤er. The rst-order conditions for quality and price
are analogous to (22) and (24) where bi is replaced by ebi. As before, higher altruism implies a
higher incentive to increase quality because it increases consumersutility. However, if the rms
altruistic concerns do not encompass consumerspurchasing expenditures, higher altruism does
not have a direct negative e¤ect on prices. Thus, @
ebi
@pi
= 0 and @
ebi
@qi
+ @
ebi
@pi
@xi=@qi
 @xi=@pi = xi > 0. The
optimality condition (24) therefore reduces to
(1  ) (xi   cq) + xi = gq; (31)
and, for a given level of e¤ort, it is now the case that higher altruism leads to higher quality.19
If rms are su¢ ciently altruistic, prot constraints will reduce the marginal prot loss of quality
investments and the rms will optimise at a higher quality level. Applying the specic cost and
e¤ort functions given by (16)-(17), the symmetric Nash equilibrium quality is
q =
1   + 
2 ( + k (1  )) : (32)
The results for cost-containment e¤ort and price are qualitatively similar to those presented
in the Proposition 2 and are therefore not repeated here (see Brekke, Siciliani and Straume,
2011b). The following proposition summarises the e¤ects of prot constraints on quality for the
alternative formulation of altruistic preferences:
19Notice that, in the symmetric equilibrium, we have (1  )   1
2
  cq

+ 
2
= gq.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that the rms care about gross consumer utility excluding expenditures.
Under quality and price competition, placing a constraint on prot distribution leads to a higher
level of quality in equilibrium if and only if altruism is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,  > =k.
6 Welfare analysis
As a welfare benchmark with which to compare the previously derived Nash equilibria, we dene
the rst-best outcome as the one that maximises aggregate gross consumersutility net of the
monetary and non-monetary costs of quality, output and cost containment. That is, we dene
the rst-best outcome as the one that would ensue if a welfarist regulator produces the good
himself, using the available technology (given by the cost functions and rm locations).
Since consumers are uniformly distributed on S, total transportation costs are minimised by
letting each rm serve half the market. The maximisation problem is thus
max
q1;q2;e1;e2
W =
Z 1
2
0
(v + q1   tx) dx+
Z 1
1
2
(v + q2   t (1  x)) dx
 
2X
i=1

c

1
2
; qi; ei

+ g (qi; ei)

: (33)
Using the cost and disutility functions given by (16) and (17) we obtain the rst-best quality
and cost containment e¤ort:
q1 = q2 = q
FB =
1
2 (k + )
; (34)
e1 = e2 = e
FB =
1
2w
: (35)
Comparing (35) with (19) or (27), notice that, whether prices are regulated or not, the market
provides the optimal level of cost containment only in the absence of prot constraints. Otherwise
(for  > 0) the degree of cost e¢ ciency is suboptimally low. Equilibrium quality, on the other
hand, might be underprovided or overprovided. As will be shown below, this depends partly on
whether prices are regulated or not.
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6.1 Price regulation
For the case of regulated prices, we ask two separate questions. First, what is the rst-best
price and how does it vary with prot constraints? Second, for a given price, is the imposition
of prot constraints welfare increasing or welfare reducing?
6.1.1 The rst-best price
By setting p such that the equilibrium quality, given by (18), coincides with the rst-best quality,
given by (34), we obtain
pFB =
(1  ) (c  e) + t +k(1 )(k+)   

1
2(k+) +
t
2 + v

1      ; (36)
where e = (1 )2w .
Notice that, if  =  = 0, then pFB = c e+t. Without altruism and prot constraints, the
optimal rst-best price is equal to the marginal production costs plus the transportation cost
parameter t. Higher transportation costs reduce quality which needs to be compensated with a
higher price. If  = 0 and  > 0, then
pFB = (c  e) + t

(1  ) k + 
(1  ) (k + )

> c  e + t: (37)
With no altruism, prot constraints imply a higher optimal price. Since prot constraints reduce
quality and increase the marginal cost of provision (through lower e¤ort e), a higher price is
needed to achieve the rst-best outcome, i.e., @pFB=@ > 0.
In the presence of altruism, however, constraints on prot distribution do not necessarily
lead to a higher rst-best price. The reason is that prot constraints can increase quality for
su¢ ciently high altruism (cf. Proposition 1), which may induce a lower rst-best price.
Proposition 4 Prots constraints increase (reduce) the rst-best regulated price if the degree of
altruism is su¢ ciently low (high).
This result implies that price and prot constraints can be regulatory complements or sub-
stitutes. If altruism is low, they are complements: the imposition of prot constraints leads to
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a higher price. If altruism is high, they are substitutes: prot constraints are accompanied by a
lower price.
6.1.2 Welfare e¤ects of prot constraints
Evaluating social welfare at the equilibrium level of quality and cost containment under price
regulation, but where the price is not necessarily at the rst-best level given by (36), yields
W (q(p; ); e(p; )) = 2
"Z 1
2
0
(v + q   tx) dx  c

1
2
; q; e

  g (q; e)
#
: (38)
The welfare e¤ect of imposing prot constraints is thus given by
dW
d
=
@W
@q
@q
@
+
@W
@e
@e
@
: (39)
Notice that @W=@e = 0 for  = 0, since cost containment is at the rst-best level in the absence
of prot constraints. This means that the imposition of a su¢ ciently small prot constraint will
always improve social welfare if it brings quality closer to the rst-best level, i.e., if @W@q
@q
@ > 0.
The welfare e¤ects of introducing a small (low impact) prot constraint can be qualitatively
characterised as follows:
Proposition 5 Consider the imposition of a su¢ ciently small prot constraint on rms that
are subject to price regulation. (i) For a su¢ ciently low price, there exist strictly positive lower
and upper threshold levels of , such that the prot constraint improves welfare for intermediate
levels of altruism. (ii) For a su¢ ciently high price, there exists a strictly positive upper threshold
level of , such that the prot constraint improves welfare if the degree of altruism is below this
level.
If the price is su¢ ciently low, there is underprovision (overprovision) of quality if the degree
of altruism is below (above) a certain threshold level. In this case, there always exists an
intermediate range of  such that a low impactprot constraint improves welfare, either by
increasing quality when it is underprovided or by reducing it when it is overprovided. On the
other hand, if the price is su¢ ciently high, quality is always overprovided and a small prot
constraint will in this case increase welfare as long as it leads to lower quality provision, i.e., if
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 < b.
The analysis would be slightly di¤erent in the case of a tightening of an existing prot
constraint (where  > 0 to begin with). This is more likely to reduce welfare as @W=@e > 0
and @e=@ < 0. Even if prot constraints bring equilibrium quality closer to the rst-best level,
the welfare e¤ect is ambiguous since the reduction in quality distortion is counteracted by the
welfare loss of lower cost e¢ ciency. Substituting for @W@e
@e
@ , the overall welfare e¤ect is given by
dW
d
=
@W
@q
@q
@
  
4w
: (40)
Since the rst term does not depend on the marginal disutility of e¤ort, w, it follows that
the result stated in Proposition 5 holds qualitatively also for a tightening of an existing prot
constraint if the marginal disutility of e¤ort is su¢ ciently high. Intuitively, if cost containment is
su¢ ciently costly, distortions along this dimension will be small and the welfare e¤ect of tighter
prot constraints will mainly be determined by the quality response.
6.2 Quality and price competition
Suppose that rms compete in terms of quality and price. Comparing (26) and (34), it is
straightforward to verify that q < qFB if  > 0 and q = qFB if  = 0. Thus, under quality
and price competition, quality is always underprovided in the presence of prot constraints.
This result represents an intuitive extension to the existing literature. If  =  = 0, our model
corresponds to the one analysed by Ma and Burgess (1993), who conclude that the market
provides the optimal level of quality if quality and price decisions are made simultaneously.20
Since equilibrium quality does not depend on the degree of altruism and prot constraints lead
to lower quality (cf. Proposition 2), the above-stated result follows directly. Prot-constrained
rms that compete on both quality and price will o¤er quality that is below the optimal rst-best
level, regardless of whether the rms have altruistic preferences or not. The policy implications
of this result are straightforward, and can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 6 When rms compete on quality and price, welfare is maximised with no con-
straints on prot distribution. Imposing such constraints on the rms will always reduce welfare
20Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2010) show that this result does not hold in the presence of income e¤ects in
demand.
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due to lower quality and less cost containment e¤ort.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed the impact of prot constraints on altruistic rms incentives
to invest in quality and cost e¢ ciency. Using a spatial competition approach, where consumers
choose providers based on travelling distance, quality and price, we have derived the market
equilibrium under quality competition with regulated prices and under quality-price competition.
We have also analysed the welfare e¤ects of price regulation and prot constraints.
Our analysis has o¤ered two sets of insights. In terms of market outcomes, we have showed
that a constraint on prot distribution always leads to less cost e¢ ciency, whereas the e¤ect on
quality and prices are more ambiguous. If prices are regulated, prot constraints lead to increased
quality provision only if the rms are su¢ ciently altruistic. Otherwise, for low (or zero) levels of
altruism, prot-constrained rms o¤er lower quality than rms that are not prot-constrained.
On the other hand, if rms are allowed to compete on both quality and price, prot constraints
always have a negative e¤ect on quality provision, while the e¤ect on prices is ambiguous; prot
constraints lead to lower (higher) prices if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high (low).
In terms of welfare outcomes, we have showed that prot constraints lead to too low levels of
cost e¢ ciency, while quality may be over- or underprovided in the market equilibrium, depending
on the degree of altruism, if prices are regulated. Consequently, prot constraints might improve
welfare if the regulated price is not set at the optimal level. Under optimal price regulation, prot
constraints increase (reduce) the regulated price if altruism is su¢ ciently low (high), implying
that price and prot constraints are either complements or substitutes. For example, markets
with non-prot (as opposed to for-prot) rms should optimally face a lower (higher) price if
the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high (low). On the other hand, if prices are set by the rms,
the imposition of prot constraints always reduce welfare due to underprovision of quality and
insu¢ cient cost containment.
Before concluding the paper, let us briey mention some possible extensions and limitations
of our study. We have considered an oligopoly model with competition between a xed number
rms. The number of rms could have been endogenised, for instance, by deriving the free-entry
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equilibrium.21 This is likely to generate di¤erent results with respect to the e¤ects of prot
constraints, but would require a di¤erent set up, and is thus beyond the scope of our study.
The kind of markets where prot-constrained rms are frequently observed, such as health care,
long-term care, education, etc., typically have restrictions on entry. Our analysis of oligopolistic
competition between a xed number of (prot-constrained) rms should therefore be highly
relevant.
Another possible extension is to allow rms to select the location in addition to the quality
and price. By placing the rms at the endpoints of the Hotelling line, we implicitly assume that
rms would choose maximum (horizontal) product di¤erentiation. However, this assumption
is consistent with existing literature that show that rms will locate at maximum distance in
order to dampen quality (and price) competition (e.g., Economides, 1989; Brekke, Nuscheler
and Straume, 2006). Thus, endogenising location choices is not likely to provide any additional
insight from the analysis.
21Lakdawalla and Philipson (2000) analyse competition between non-prot and for-prot providers in an in-
dustry with free entry.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Setting  = ce = gq = 0, the expression in (13) is reduced to
@q
@
=
  p cx2t   cq
(1  )   cxq2t + cqq : (A1)
From (11),  = gq = 0 implies that
p cx
2t   cq = 0, which means that @q=@ = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Setting  = ce = 0, the expression in (13) reduces to
@q
@
=
  p cx2t   cq
(1  )   cxq2t + cqq+ gqq ; (A2)
while (11) reduces to
(1  )

p  cx
2t
  cq

  gq = 0;
implying that p cx2t   cq > 0 in equilibrium. Since the denominator in (A2) is positive (by the
second-order condition), this implies @q=@ < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Setting  = gq = 0, the rst-order condition (11) is reduced to
(1  )

p  cx
2t
  cq

= 0;
which implies that (13) and (14) reduce to, respectively,
@e
@
=
1

ce (1  )
cxq
2t
+ cqq

< 0 (A3)
and
@q
@
=   1

ce (1  )

ceq +
cex
2t

< 0: (A4)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Setting ce = gq = 0, (13) reduces to (A1). However, the rst-order
condition (11) is now reduced to
(1  )

p  cx
2t
  cq

+

2

1
2
+
v + q   p
t

= 0;
26
SNF Working Paper No 30/12
implying that p cx2t   cq < 0 in equilibrium, which further implies that @q=@ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. From (18), the e¤ect of a (stronger) prot constraint on equilib-
rium quality is given by
@q
@
=
(  2t) (1   + w (p  c)) + ktw (t+ 2 (v   p))  kt (   1)2
w (2t ( + k (1  ))  )2
< (>) 0 if  < (>) b := kt (1  )2 + 2t (1  ) + 2tw (p  c)
(1  ) + w (p  c) + kt2w + 2ktw (v   p) :
The set A = (b; ) is non-empty since
  b = kt2w (t (2 (v   p) + t) (k (1  ) + ) + (1  ) (p  c)) + (1  )2
1   + w (kt (2 (v   p) + t) + p  c) > 0:
The e¤ect of prot constraints on cost containment follows directly from (19). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (26), the e¤ect of a (stronger) prot constraint on equilib-
rium quality is given by
@q
@
=   
2 ( + k (1  ))2 < 0:
From (28), the e¤ect on equilibrium prices is given by
@p
@
=
(1  )2 ( + k (1  ))2   
2w (1     )2 ( + k (1  ))2 ;
where
 := (w (2 (v   c)  t) + 2 (1  )) ( + k (1  ))2 + w

k (1  )2 + 

:
The sign of @p

@ is given by the sign of the numerator. This is clearly positive for  = 0, while
setting  at the highest permissible level,  = , yields
  (1  ) ( + k (1  )) [w (1  ) + ( + k (1  )) (1   + w (2 (v   c)  t))] < 0:
The existence of a threshold value bp, such that @p=@ > (< 0) if  < (>) bp, is conrmed by
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noticing that  is monotonically increasing in , since
@
@
= w > 0:
The e¤ect of prot constraints on cost containment follows directly from (27). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (32), the e¤ect of a (stronger) prot constraint on equilib-
rium quality is given by
@q
@
=
k  
2 ( + k (1  ))2 > (<) 0 if  > (<)

k
:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. From (36) we nd that @pFB=@ < (>) 0 if
 > (<)
(k + ) (1  )2 + 2tw
w (1 + (t+ 2v) ( + k)) + 2 ((k + ) (1  )  w (k (c+ t) + c)) > 0:
The positive sign of this expression is established by imposing the parameter restriction v  c+t,
which combines the conditions that secure full market coverage and non-negative mark-ups.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Comparing (18) and (34), there is underprovision (overprovision)
of quality when altruism is su¢ ciently low (high). Analytically,
q (p) < (>) qFB if  < (>) e;
where
e := 2t ( + k (1  ))  2 (k + ) (1  ) (p  c+ e)
1 + 2 (k + )
 
t
2 + v   p
 :
From Proposition 1 we know that prot constraints increase (reduce) equilibrium quality if
 > (<) b. It is straightforward to conrm (by a simple numerical example) that the ranking
of e and b is ambiguous within the valid parameter space. Now consider the imposition of a
su¢ ciently small prot constraint. There are four possible regimes:
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1. If  > max fe; bg, quality, which is overprovided, increases even further and welfare is
reduced.
2. If  < min fe; bg, quality, which is underprovided, reduces even further and welfare is
reduced.
3. If b <  < e, quality, which is underprovided, increases and welfare improves.
4. If e <  < b, quality, which is overprovided, reduces and welfare improves.
Notice that e (>) < 0 if p is su¢ ciently low (high). Thus, for a highregulated price (such
that e < 0), only the rst and last of the above regimes exist, implying that quality is always
overprovided. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. The result follows directly from comparing (26) with (34), and
(27) with (35). Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Mixed markets
Suppose that the market consists of one rm that is prot-constrained ( > 0) and one that
is not ( = 0); for example, a market where a non-prot rm competes against a for-prot rm.22
We consider quality competition with regulated prices (as in Section 4) and use the specic cost
and e¤ort functions given by (16)-(17).
For exogenous levels of cost e¢ ciency, equilibrium quality levels are given by23 ;24
qNC =
2PCepNC   2 (1  ) epPC +  (PC   )
NCPC   2 ; (B1)
qPC =
2 (1  )NCepPC   2epNC +  (NC   )
NCPC   2 ; (B2)
where epi := p   (c  ei) > 0 is the price-cost margin of Firm i, while  := 2 (v   p) + t > 0,
NC := 4t ( + k)  3 > 0 and PC := 4t [ + (1  ) k]  3 > 0.25
22Rose-Ackerman (1996) shows that in sectors where non-prot rms operate, they tend to coexist with for-
prot rms.
23An interior equilibrium requires that qi > 0 and
 
qi   qj
 2 ( t; t), i; j = PC;NC; i 6= j. These conditions
are satised if the cost di¤erence jei   ej j is not too large, otherwise the less e¢ cient rm is driven out of the
market. The exact conditions can be provided upon request.
24The prot-constrained rm is denoted by subscript PC, while the rm that does not face any prot constraints
is denoted by subscript NC.
25Uniqueness and stability of the Nash equilibrium requires that NCPC   2 > 0:
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In equilibrium, each rms quality choice increases with the level of cost e¢ ciency, i.e.,
@qNC
@eNC
=
2PC
NCPC   2 > 0;
@qPC
@ePC
=
2 (1  )NC
NCPC   2 > 0:
The reason is that a lower marginal production cost increases the prot margin and thus the
incentive to improve quality to attract consumers. This e¤ect is weaker for the prot-constrained
rm, since it only captures a fraction of the higher prot margin. Furthermore, if a rm becomes
more e¢ cient, the competing rms quality incentives are discouraged, i.e.,
@qNC
@ePC
=
 2 (1  )
NCPC   2 < 0;
@qPC
@eNC
=
 2
NCPC   2 < 0:
This e¤ect is due to rmsquality investments being strategic substitutes26, which is explained
by the rmsaltruistic preferences.27 A quality increase by one rm leads to a demand drop
for the competing rm. Since lower demand reduces the marginal consumer benet of quality,
the optimal response for an altruistic rm is therefore to reduce its quality. Thus, quality
investments generate a negative externality between the rms. This strategic e¤ect is stronger for
the prot-constrained rm, since the competing rm, which is not prot-constrained, responds
more aggressively to a higher margin in terms of quality investments.
This strategic substitutability implies that the rmsresponses to a tightening of the prot
constraint always go in opposite directions. From (B1)-(B2) we have
@qPC=@ < (>) 0() @qNC=@ > (<) 0:
Thus, if a tightening of the prot constraint leads to an increase in the quality supplied by the
prot-constrained rm, the competing rm will respond by lowering its quality level, and vice
versa.
Comparing the equilibrium quality levels, it follows from (B1)-(B2) that, if the rms are
equally e¢ cient (implying epNC = epPC), the prot-constrained rm provides the higher quality
26This can easily be veried by observing that
sign

dqi
dqj

= sign

@2
i
@qj@qi

=   
4t
< 0:
27Notice that quality investments are strategic substitutes only if the rms are to some degree altruistic ( > 0).
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level if epi (2t   ) < kt. This condition holds only if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently
high, for reasons provided by the discussion in Section 4.
When cost e¢ ciency is endogenous, and rms choose quality and cost containment e¤ort
simultaneously, the equilibrium levels of quality and cost containment e¤ort are given by
eNC =
2 (p  c)w (4t   2) + tw  NCPC   2  2 (1  )2 (NC + )  4ktw
2w

tw (NCPC   2)  (PC + )  (1  )2 (NC + )
 ; (B3)
ePC = (1  )
wt
 
NCPC   2 + 4k
  2 (PC + )  4w (2t   ) (p  c)
2w

tw (NCPC   2)  (PC + )  (1  )2 (NC + )
 ; (B4)
qNC =
264 2w (p  c) (wt (PC   (1  ))  (1  ) (2  ))
+tw

PC   (1  )2 

  2 (1  )2   w

1 + (1  )2   tw (PC   )

375
w

tw (NCPC   2)  (PC + )  (1  )2 (NC + )
 ; (B5)
qPC =
264 2w (p  c) (wt ((1  )NC   )  (1  ) (2  ))
+tw

(1  )2 NC   

  2 (1  )2   w

1 + (1  )2   tw (NC   )

375
w

tw (NCPC   2)  (PC + )  (1  )2 (NC + )
 : (B6)
The complexity of these expressions necessitates the use of numerical simulations. We focus on
our two main parameters of interest, namely the degree of altruism () and the tightness of the
prot constraint (). The remaining parameters are xed as follows: v = 4, p = w = 2 and
c = g = k =  = t = 1.28
28The parameter values are set such that they do not violate any of the conditions required for the interior
equilibrium outcome given by (B3)-(B6).
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Table A1. Quality competition in a mixed duopoly
 = 0  = 0:25  = 0:5
 = 0:1  = 0:5  = 0:8  = 0:1  = 0:5  = 0:8  = 0:1  = 0:5  = 0:8
eNC 0:26 0:28 0:31 0:25 0:27 0:28 0:25 0:24 0:23
ePC 0:22 0:11 0:04 0:22 0:11 0:04 0:22 0:13 0:05
qNC 0:31 0:32 0:33 0:50 0:51 0:51 0:71 0:71 0:70
qPC 0:29 0:19 0:09 0:49 0:43 0:38 0:71 0:73 0:78
xNC 0:51 0:57 0:62 0:51 0:54 0:57 0:50 0:49 0:46
NC 0:60 0:68 0:76 0:51 0:56 0:60 0:37 0:36 0:32
PC 0:55 0:46 0:39 0:48 0:42 0:38 0:36 0:31 0:26X
bi 2:05 2:01 1:97 2:24 2:22 2:20 2:46 2:47 2:49

NC 0:48 0:55 0:61 0:61 0:66 0:70 0:67 0:65 0:59

PC 0:41 0:20 0:07 0:54 0:36 0:24 0:63 0:50 0:42
In the case of no altruism, an increase in  induces the prot-constrained rm to choose a
lower level of quality and cost containment e¤ort since it appropriates less of the prot margin.
The competing rm, which is not prot-constrained, responds by increasing its quality and
e¤ort levels due to the strategic substitutability explained above.29 Consumer surplus decreases
because of the quality reduction by the prot-constrained rm and the corresponding increase
in travelling costs due to the marginal consumer being shifted away from the market centre.
Altruism ( > 0) shifts up the quality levels for both rms, but the e¤ect is stronger for
the prot-constrained rm. Indeed, for high levels of altruism ( = 0:5), the quality ranking
is reversed and the prot-constrained rm o¤ers higher quality than its competitor. This is
consistent with Proposition 1. Consequently, the prot-constrained rm has a higher market
share when altruism is su¢ ciently high. This also implies that the prot-constrained rm has
the higher payo¤ (i.e., 
PC > 
NC for  = 0:5). Moreover, a tightening of the prot-constraint
reduces the payo¤ of the rm that is not prot-constrained. In other words, for high levels of
29 It is straightforward to show that these results (eNC > e

PC and q

NC > q

PC) hold for all valid parameter
congurations when  = 0.
32
SNF Working Paper No 30/12
altruism, the rm that is not prot-constrained su¤ers from competing with a prot-constrained
rm. Nevertheless, the prot-constrained rm always remains the less e¢ cient in equilibrium.30
How are consumers a¤ected by a tightening of the prot constraint? This depends on the
degree of altruism. For low levels of altruism, a stronger prot constraint reduces consumers
surplus. The reason is that the marginal consumer is distorted away from the market centre,
and this is not o¤set by higher quality levels. However, for high levels of altruism ( = 0:5), a
tighter prot constraint improves consumer surplus, despite the fact that the marginal consumer
is located even further away from the market centre. Thus, the quality improvements more than
o¤set the higher travelling costs.
Appendix C: Quality-then-price competition
Here we show that the relationship between prot constraints and equilibrium quality under
price competition (see Section 5) is qualitatively una¤ected by the assumed sequence of the
quality and price decisions. Suppose that, in contrast to the assumptions used in Section 5,
rms can commit to a certain level of quality before setting prices. More specically, consider
the following sequence of moves:
1. The rms choose qualities,
2. The rms choose prices and cost containment e¤orts.
Solving the game by backwards induction, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome
is:31
q =
(1  )

tw (4 (1  )  3)  (1  )2

4

tw (3 (1  )  2)  (1  )2

( + k (1  ))
; (C1)
p =
2 (1  )2 (3tw   (1  )) (2w (t+ c)  (1  )) ( + k (1  )) + w	
4w (1     )

tw (3 ((1  ))  2)  (1  )2

( + k (1  ))
; (C2)
e =
1  
2w
; (C3)
30This result is hard to prove analytically, but extensive numerical simulations indicate that eNC > e

PC for
parameter values within the valid range.
31 Intermediate calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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where
	 := (1  )

(1  )2   tw (4 (1  )  3)

+ 4 ( + k (1  )) tw (2v + t)
 2 ( + k (1  )) (1  ) tw (6 (2t+ c) + 6v   5t  2c) + 2 ( + k (1  )) (1  )2 (2v + 3t) :
(C4)
Non-negative values of q and p (and thus equilibrium existence) require that the parameter
space is restricted by the following set of inequalities:
 < 1   < tw: (C5)
From (C1) we have
@q
@
=    
4 ( + k (1  ))2

tw (3 (1  )  2)  (1  )2
2 ; (C6)
where
  : =  (1  )4 + tw (1  )2 ((1  ) (k (1  )  6) + 12tw)
+tw

(1  )2 (3   2k (1  )) + tw ((1  ) (k (1  )  16) + 6)

: (C7)
The sign of @q=@ depends on the sign of  . We can determine the sign of   by considering
@ 
@
= (1  )4 + 6tw (1  )2 (2tw   (1  ))  e  (C8)
where e  := tw ((1  ) (16tw   3 (1  ))  6tw) : (C9)
Further,
@e 
@
= tw
h
16tw (1  )  3 (1  )2   12tw
i
: (C10)
The expression in square brackets is monotonically decreasing in . At the upper limit of ,
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 = 1  , we have
16tw (1  )  3 (1  )2   12tw = (1  ) (4tw   3 (1  )) > 0; (C11)
where the positive sign follows from (C5). Consequently, @e =@ > 0. It follows that @ =@
reaches its minimum when  is at its upper limit. Setting  = 1   yields
@ 
@
= (1  )2 (tw   (1  )) (2tw   (1  )) > 0; (C12)
where the positive sign is conrmed by (C5). Thus,   is monotonically increasing in  and
reaches its minimum value for  = 0. Inserting  = 0 in (C7) yields
  = ktw (1  )2 (tw+ (1  ) (1     2)) > 0; (C13)
where the positive sign is conrmed by applying (C5). Using (C12), this implies that   is
positive for all   0 and therefore, @q=@ < 0. Thus, imposing a prot constraint on the
rms will always lead to lower quality in equilibrium. This conrms that the negative e¤ect of
prot constraints on quality provision reported in Proposition 2 is robust to the extension of
sequential decision making, where rms choose qualities before prices.
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Firms in markets such as health care and education are often profit constrained 
due to regulation or their non-profit status, and they are often viewed as being 
altruistic towards consumers. We use a spatial competition framework to study 
incentives for cost containment and quality provision by altruistic firms facing 
profit constraints. If prices are regulated, profit constraints lead to lower cost 
containment efforts, but higher quality if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic. 
Under price competition, profit constraints reduce quality and cost containment 
efforts, but lead to lower prices if and only if firms are sufficiently altruistic. Profit 
constrained firms’ cost containment efforts are below the first-best, while their 
quality might be too high or too low. If prices are regulated, profit constraints can 
improve welfare and be a complement or substitute to a higher regulated price, 
depending on the degree of altruism.
